Iran's Internet Lifeline: 7 Cables for 90 Million People

Seven Cables for 90 Million

Iran is connected to the global internet through 7 submarine cables with 7 landing points along the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman: Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Chabahar, Ganaveh, Jask, Kharg Island, and the Soroosh platform. The GeoCables isolation index is 40/100, indicating moderate but noticeable fragility: a country with a population of approximately 90 million relies on a relatively narrow bundle of routes, all of which pass through the waters of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. For comparison, most major economies with a comparable population have significantly more exit points in various directions.

The oldest operational cable, UAE-Iran, spans 170 km and was commissioned in 1992. It connects the country to the UAE and is essentially a relic from the pre-internet era of telecommunications. The longest route, FALCON (10,300 km, RFS 2006), forms an arc from the Persian Gulf to the eastern coast of Africa, linking Iran to a broader Indian Ocean network. Regional systems such as GBICS/MENA (5,270 km, 2012), OMRAN/EPEG (600 km, 2013), POI (400 km, 2012), and Kuwait-Iran (380 km, 2005) complete the picture. Notably, GBICS/MENA appears in the registry twice, with one entry lacking confirmed data on length and commissioning year, which in itself highlights the opacity of Iran's telecom infrastructure.

The State as the Sole Gateway

The architecture of Iran's internet was not designed as an open network but as a managed system with centralized control over traffic exchange points. It is known that all international connectivity in the country is routed through a limited number of state-affiliated operators, effectively turning each cable landing into a checkpoint. The National Information Network (NIN), which Tehran has been developing since the 2010s, creates an internal infrastructure capable of functioning even if external channels are disconnected.

Important clarification: GeoCables does not have monitoring probes inside Iran, so the platform does not conduct direct measurements of DNS censorship or traffic filtering at the cable route level. All known information about blockages and slowdowns comes from independent organizations (OONI, NetBlocks) and journalists: episodic outages during the 2019 and 2022 protests, constant blocking of foreign platforms, and the throttling of VPN traffic. GeoCable analytics operates at the physical layer-delays and RTT anomalies-rather than at the content level.

War and the Strait of Hormuz

Over the past 60 days, the news landscape surrounding Iran has changed dramatically. According to GeoCables monitoring, conflict signals include events such as U.S.-Israeli strikes resulting in thousands of casualties, U.S.-Iran negotiations in Switzerland, their breakdown, and the subsequent signing of some agreement. All eight conflict monitoring zones tracked by GeoCables within the country (Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Ahvaz, Bandar Abbas, Tabriz, Mashhad, Karaj) currently register the maximum alert score of 0.000-no active cable incidents related to hostilities have been recorded at the time of publication.

Nevertheless, the mere fact of negotiations about closing the Strait of Hormuz-a key waterway along which several cables land in Bandar Abbas and Jask-represents a structural risk that exists regardless of the current zero-alert status. This is not an abstract threat: in 2019-2020, tensions in the strait already led to insurance restrictions on cable repair operations in the region.

Hormuz as the Main Chokepoint

The Strait of Hormuz is not a metaphor but a specific physical bottleneck approximately 55 km wide at its narrowest point. Routes such as FALCON, GBICS/MENA, UAE-Iran, and Kuwait-Iran pass through or near it. In any scenario of escalation in the strait-mining, ship seizures, military operations-repairing damaged cables becomes virtually impossible, as cable-laying ships do not enter active conflict zones.

The only landing point geographically located outside the Persian Gulf is Chabahar on the shores of the Gulf of Oman. This is where OMRAN/EPEG and, partially, FALCON pass through. Theoretically, this is a backup route less vulnerable to a blockade of the strait. However, its capacity does not compensate for the loss of other cables, and the port of Chabahar itself is in a strategically sensitive region at the intersection of Iranian, Pakistani, and Afghan interests.

Neighboring transit countries through which traffic flows include the UAE, Oman, Kuwait, and Pakistan. If bilateral relations with any of them deteriorate, the transit route could come under pressure of a political rather than physical nature.

What GeoCables Monitors

The platform's monitoring focuses on all 7 cables with Iranian landings, with an emphasis on RTT anomalies along routes passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Over the past 30 days, one delay anomaly was recorded on the country's cables-a single deviation that nonetheless warrants observation amid military-diplomatic turbulence. Special attention is given to:

• FALCON-as the longest and most geographically diversified route;
• GBICS/MENA-as the primary regional traffic aggregator for the Persian Gulf;
• Landings in Bandar Abbas and Jask-as points of highest cable concentration near potential conflict zones.

The absence of probes within the country limits the ability to conduct applied monitoring at the level of user traffic. However, the physical layer-delays, route deviations, and the condition of cable segments-remains under observation. In a context where negotiations over the Strait of Hormuz are ongoing and their outcome is uncertain, the resilience of these seven cables is a matter not only of connectivity but also of geopolitical calculus.